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THE DILUTION SOLUTION: THE HISTORY AND
EVOLUTION OF TRADEMARK DILUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Without even realizing it, many of us spend our entire lives as
both pawns and kings in a game of corporate recognition and
repeat business. From the moment we awake, we spend virtually
every moment of our daily lives surrounded by the sights, sounds,
colors, and shapes of advertising. To the average person, the
shameless self-promotion of business hardly causes a stir. To
others, the incessant bombardment of products and self-
patronizing advertisements create an ongoing legal struggle where
the consumer is wooed and manipulated like a pawn but possesses
the power of a king in determining the fate of a business.
This power, possessed by all consumers in market systems
featuring competing products and free choice, has led to the
development of trademark protection laws. A trademark is any
word, name, symbol, or device, or combination thereof that is used
to distinguish the goods of one manufacturer from the goods of
another manufacturer and to identify the source of the goods
bearing the mark, even if that source is unknown.! The importance
of a trademark is easily understood when one considers a
consumer's propensity to reward the producer of a satisfactory
product with repeat business and punish the producer of an
unsatisfactory product with the denial of future business. Stated
another way, when a consumer purchases a product bearing a
specific name, logo, or other distinguishing device and is satisfied,
that consumer will purchase future products bearing that same
device based upon his or her previous satisfaction. Likewise, a
consumer has an increased tendency to avoid any goods bearing
the device of a product with which they were unsatisfied. "Put
simply 'a trademark is that which makes tomorrow's business
1 15 U.S.C. §1127 (West 2002).
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something more than an accident."' 2 Thus, a trademark actually
sells the goods, and "self-evidently, the more distinctive the mark,
the more effective is its selling power."3 Despite the obvious
importance of trademarks to the success of businesses and the
power wielded by consumers, the protection afforded trademarks
is traditionally designed to protect the consumer.
Prior to 1996, trademark infringement was the only form of
federal trademark protection available.4 The consumer protection
premise of trademark infringement becomes apparent in a simple
analysis of its elements. The cornerstone of trademark
infringement is the likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception
as to the affiliation, sponsorship, or endorsement of a product
among an appreciable number of ordinary consumers.5  This is
most often referred to as simply "the likelihood of confusion."
The likelihood of confusion test for trademark infringement
sounds simple, but how does one objectively determine if a
consumer is likely to be confused? To address this issue, courts
have developed a test to determine if the likelihood of consumer
confusion exists. Though some of the Federal Circuits have
modified the test, Judge Friendly in the Second Circuit articulated
the standard test, known as the Polaroid Factors. 6 The Polaroid
factors are: 1) The strength of the plaintiffs mark; 2) the degree of
similarity between the two marks; 3) the proximity of the marks in
marketing channels; 4) the likelihood that the senior user of the
mark will bridge the marketing gap between its products and the
junior user's products; 5) evidence of actual confusion; 6) the
defendant's good faith in adopting its mark; 7) the quality of the
defendant's products; and 8) the sophistication of the consumers
for the products. 7 Based on these factors, the scope of protection
2 Robert N. Kliger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PiTT. L. REv. 789 (quoting United States
Trademark Association, Trademarks in Advertising and Selling 1 (1966)).
3 F. I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L.
REv. 813 (1927).
4 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (West 2002).
' 15 U.S.C. §1114 (West 2002).
6 Polaroid Corp. v Polaroid Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
7 Id. at 495.
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from trademark infringement is limited to similar goods from
competing, or foreseeably competing, companies. Nothing in this
analysis, however, protects goodwill of a trademark developed and
maintained to such an extent that the signaling device placed on
any product may lead to an economic loss, or at the very least a
loss of trademark control of the trademark owner. Put simply,
there is nothing in traditional trademark protection to protect the
owners of famous trademarks from the whittling away of the
mark's distinctive and famous nature through unlicensed use on
non-competing products, commonly known as dilution.
In 1996, the federal government recognized what states and the
common law have recognized for decades: Famous trademarks are
entitled to protection from dilution. 8  Despite the federal
government's late entry into the antidilution theory, courts began
to see the wisdom of providing trademark protection to businesses
nearly seventy years prior.9 This paper will attempt to outline the
roots of dilution protection in the common law, the evolution, of
dilution into a federal statute, and assess external forces that
contributed to the gradual rise of the federal dilution doctrine.
II. THE ROOTS OF DILUTION
Trademark protection has its roots in the common law action of
deceit.10 It originated as a police measure to protect the public
from the sale of defective goods and to protect the integrity of the
guilds." The foundation of the action is the passing off of goods
as the goods of another, thereby, confusing the public and
diverting sales from the owner of the trademark.' 2  The action
itself, however, was limited to confusingly similar marks on
" 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
9 Eastman Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 Reports Patent Cases 105 (1898), citing
Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917).
10 1 J. McCarthy, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:2 (1973).
" Schecter, supra note 3, at 825.
12 R. C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV.
158 (1982).
.2002]
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directly competitive goods. 13
A. Trademark Law Prior to the Recognition of Dilution
Notwithstanding the requirement of directly competing goods,
courts in the United States began to sense a fundamental shift in
the traditional notion of trademark protection. The first indication
of this inescapable shift was witnessed in England. Eastman
Company, the manufacturer of Kodak cameras, filed suit against
Kodak Cycle Company for the use of the KODAK mark on
bicycles. 14 Eastman was ultimately successful in enjoining Kodak
from the use of the Kodak trademark and the subsequent
expungement of the mark.15 In reaching its decision, the Eastman
Court stated:
... [I]t appears to me that to allow [Kodak Cycles]
to use the word 'Kodak' as part of the title of the
Kodak Cycle Company, Limited, would be to give
them the benefit of what, in my opinion,
substantially amounts to an improper dealing on
their part. It would be to allow this company
certainly to cause confusion between it and the
plaintiff company. I think it would injure the
plaintiff company, and would cause the defendant
company to be identified with the plaintiff
company, or to be recognized by the public as being
connected with it, and I think, accordingly, the
defendant.., ought to be restrained from carrying
on business under that name. Moreover, it appears
to me that they ought not to be permitted to sell
their cycles under the name of the 'Kodak Cycles'
for similar reasons. I think it would lead to
confusion, I think it would lead to deception, and I
13 See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 730 cmt. a (1938).
14 Eastman Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 Reports Patent Cases 105 (1898), citing
Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917).
" Id. at 410.
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think it would be injurious to the plaintiff
company.16
Thus, the Eastman Court held that products that do not directly
compete may still "lead to confusion." In actuality, the court was
not deciding confusion or deceit. Instead it recognized the distinct
nature of Eastman's trademark and found that it deserved
protection but couched the protection in a way to satisfy the
competing goods requirement for protection.
Though not binding, the Eastman precedent began to play a
substantial role in American courts. In Vogue Co. v. Thompson-
Hudson Co.,' 7 plaintiff, Vogue Company, published a magazine
under the trademark VOGUE and utilized the letter V with a figure
of a woman known as V-GIRL as its trademark. 8 Defendants,
Thompson and Hudson, manufactured and marketed a line of hats
bearing labels with the name VOGUE HATS and the trademark
V. 19 Plaintiff sued for legal and equitable relief based on trademark
infringement. 20 This suit was initially dismissed by the District
Court but was later reversed by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 21  In reversing the District Court's ruling, the Sixth
Circuit held that although plaintiffs VOGUE mark was
substantially descriptive, defendant's use of the letter V was so
similar to V-GIRL as to create the impression that the hats were
sponsored, made, endorsed, or approved by the plaintiff.22 In
reaching this decision, the Sixth Circuit admitted that the goods in
question did not directly compete but concluded that the
similarities between V-GIRL and V were sufficient to find
23infringement. In this instance, the court avoided extending
trademark protection to non-competing goods by citing to the few
16 Id. at 411.
17 Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509 (6h Cir. 1924).
81Id.
'9 Id. at 510.
20 id.
211id.
22 Vogue, 300 F. at 509.
2'Id. at 511.
2002]
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similarities in the marks as predominant. In essence, the Vogue
Court followed the lead of the Eastman Court and manipulated the
infringement framework to grant relief without recognizing a new
cause of action.
Similarly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
the infringement doctrine was not limited to competing goods in
Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, Inc.24 In Wall, plaintiff Rolls-
Royce, sued defendant Wall for using the ROLLS-ROYCE mark
on radio tubes.2 5 Despite the fact that Rolls-Royce manufactured
automobiles and airplanes, goods completely unrelated to radio
tubes, the Third Circuit held that Wall infringed on Rolls-Royce's
trademark because he veiled his business under Rolls-Royce's
reputation for quality.2 6 To justify its finding of infringement, the
Third Circuit stretched the bounds of reason and classified radio
tubes, and automobiles and airplanes as directly competing.27 The
court stated:
It is true [Rolls-Royce] made automobiles and
aeroplanes, and Wall sold radio tubes, and no one
could think, when he bought a radio tube, he was
buying an automobile or an aeroplane. But that is
not the test and gist of this case. Electricity is one
of the vital elements in automobile and aeroplane
construction, and, having built up a trade-name and
fame in two articles of which electrical appliances
were all important factors, what would more
naturally come to the mind of a man with a radio
tube in his receiving set, on which the name "Rolls-
Royce," with nothing else to indicate its origin, than
for him to suppose that the Rolls-Royce Company
had extended its high grade of electric products to
24 Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, Inc., 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925).
25 id.
26 Id. at 334.
27 id.
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the new, electric-using radio art as well.28
With this leap of logic, the court not only attempted to apply the
traditional trademark infringement test to a non-traditional
problem, it also began to lay the framework of fame as an element
of dilution.
With trademark protection in the early 2 0th Century focusing on
the deceitful sale or the palming off of goods, courts were forced
into the laborious practice of finding injury in the form of
consumer confusion when there was no diversion of customers or
sales but the plaintiff had suffered harm.29 In so doing, the courts
began to afford a greater level of protection to the more fanciful
and unique trademarks based upon the gradual whittling away of
the mark's inherent distinctiveness through the unauthorized use
on non-competing products.30 Thus the stage was set for the first
recognition of dilution.
B. The Birth of Dilution
The need of a new form of protection for the very identity of the
mark became evident as courts further manipulated the rule that
products must be directly competing to find infringement. In Duro
Pump & Manufacturing v. California Cedar Products,31 plaintiff,
Duro Company, manufactured and sold pneumatic pressure
systems for pumping, storing, and supplying water to residences.32
Defendant, California Cedar, manufactured and sold wallboard and
other lumber construction materials. 33  In preventing the
registration of DTRO by California Cedar, the court paid homage
to its predecessors by attempting to maneuver its analysis in a
28 id.
29 Schechter, supra note 3, at 819.
30 1id.
31 Duro Pump & Mfg. Co. v. California Cedar Products Co., 11 F.2d 205 (D.
Col. 1925).32 id.
33 id.
20021
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competing goods theory. 34  The court went one step further,
however, and recognized the possibility that the distinctive nature
of the trademark itself constituted the basis for relief.35 The court
stated:
In the present case, when the California Cedar
Products Company adopted the word 'Duro' as its
trade-mark, that word had 'become so identified
with the particular corporation' (the Duro
Company) that, whenever used, it designated to the
mind 'that particular corporation.' While the
descriptive properties of the products of the two
companies are technically different, both are used
in residences, and under the evidence, we are
constrained to the view that their concurrent use
would tend to lead to confusion of the identity of
the Duro Company. If the California Cedar
Products Company were permitted to use this mark,
which has come to represent the Duro Company
and its product to the public, other companies
likewise might use it, with resultant loss of identity
of the Duro Company.36
In holding that a loss of identity, or a whittling away of the
distinctiveness of the trademark, constituted a cause of action, the
court recognized the framework for dilution and fertilized the
ground from which the theory would grow.37
Like most trends in law, the dilution theory was based in
common law but articulated by a legal scholar. Frank I. Schechter
laid the groundwork for dilution in his semi-annual account of
trademark protection, The Historical Foundations of the Law
34 Id. at 206.
35 Id.36 Duro Pump & Mfg. Co. v. California Cedar Products Co., 11 F.2d 205 (D.
Col. 1925) (emphasis added).3 7
id.
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Relating to Trade-marks.38 The dilution theory came to life two
years later in another work by Schechter, The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection.39  Though both works started with the
premise that trademark law lagged far behind twentieth century
commercial developments, the proposed solutions of each stand in
startling contrast with each other.
In his 1925 account, Schechter advocated the abandonment of
the traditional consumer confusion test for principles that allowed
an expanded consumer confusion test because of the changing
function of trademarks in commercial transactions. Early
twentieth century law clung to the idea that trademarks, and thus
consumers, demanded protection against misidentification of a
particular and known source.40 Schechter, however; contemplated
the demise of direct producer-consumer transactions that
dominated pre-twentieth century commerce and trademark law.41
In unison with his theory for the evolution of trademark protection,
Schechter asserted that a trademark's value was no longer vested
in its ability to indicate the actual producer but a single, albeit
anonymous, source.42 Schechter further surmised, "The public is
concerned with the trademark not so much as an indication of
origin but as a guarantee of quality."43 Implicit in this argument is
the idea that the use of a single trademark on non-competing goods
has potential to injure both the senior user and consumers despite
the absence of trade diversion. 44 Thus, Schechter's early proposal
identified the expectation of quality a consumer attaches to
38 Schechter, supra note 3.3 9 F. I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REv. 813, at 825 (1927), citing Robert N. Kliger, Trademark Dilution: The
Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L.
Rsv. 789 (1997).40 Kliger, supra note 2, at 801.
41 id.
42 Frank I. Schechter, The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to
Trademarks at 150 (1925), citing Robert N. Kliger, Trademark Dilution: The
Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PiTr. L.
REV. 789 (1997).431d. at 803.
44Kliger, supra note 2, at 803.
2002]
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ROLLS-ROYCE and would protect the senior user of such a mark
from a junior user that did not produce a similar quality of goods.
Under this proposal, however, a senior user of a mark would be
unable to prevent junior users from use of the mark if it was used
on differing goods of similar quality. By all accounts, Schechter
believed this expansion of the traditional consumer confusion test
would adequately deal with the trade advances of the twentieth
century.
Much like his 1925 work, Schechter's 1927 article laid the
foundation of change by citing to the difficulties of the consumer
confusion test to then current trademark problems.45 In stark
contrast to his earlier proposal, however, Schechter advocated the
complete abandonment of the consumer confusion test because of
its continuing failures. Specifically, Schechter noted that
trademark protection did not protect the most arbitrary and
fanciful, therefore the most distinctive of marks.46 To articulate
his point, Schechter contrasted marks with little distinctiveness in
the market place to those that had been "withdrawn from the
human vocabulary by their owners and have, from the very
beginning, been associated with a particular product, not with a
variety of products, and have created in the public consciousness
an impression or symbol of the excellence of the particular product
in question. ' 4 7 Schechter noted that common trademarks such as
BLUE RIBBON, STAR, ANCHOR, and GOLD MEDAL, each
registered for a variety of goods, still fit into the traditional
competing goods analysis because of their lack of distinction. The
fact that such marks have not become associated with the
characteristics or excellence of one product does not impair its
individuality when used on various products.48 Marks that have
become associated with the characteristic or excellence of one
product, such as ROLLS-ROYCE, KODAK, and MAZDA,
however, would lose their unique distinctiveness, originality,
ingenuity, and consequently their effectiveness and selling power,
45 Schechter, supra note 3.
46Id. at 828.
471d. at 829.
48 id.
152 [Vol. XII: 143
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if courts declined to protect the application of these marks to non-
competing goods.
49
From the belief that fanciful marks are entitled to greater
protection than commonplace marks, Schechter implicitly
articulated that marks that have developed widespread recognition,
or fame, in the minds of consumers were entitled to greater
protection than marks that have not. In addition to this implicit
principle, Schechter articulated four principles that form the basis
for the theory of dilution. These are: 1) The value of a modem
trademark lies in its selling power; 2) the selling power of a mark
depends on the uniqueness, singularity, and psychological hold
upon the public, not merely the merit of the goods with which it is
used; 3) such uniqueness is impaired by the mark's use on both
related and non-related goods; and 4) the degree of protection for a
mark depends on its actual uniqueness and difference from other
marks, which is a function of the efforts and ingenuity of its
owner.5 0 Thus, Schechter believed that the real injury stemming
from the concurrent use of arbitrary trademarks on differing goods
was "the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and
hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its concurrent
use upon non-competing goods."
51
Schechter's beliefs were radical even by today's standards. He
believed that trademark rights should be recognized in gross and
that "the preservation and uniqueness of a trademark . . .
constituted the only rational basis for its protection."
52
Consequently, Schechter's dilution theory completely abandoned
consumer confusion as a cause of action. Furthermore, rather than
inquiring into the consumer confusion caused by the junior use of
a trademark, Schechter argued that courts should completely
prevent the use of arbitrary and fanciful trademarks from use by
49 Id. at 830.
so Schechter, supra note 3, at 831.
511d. at 825.
52 F. L Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L.
Rsv. 813, at 831 (1927), citing Robert N. Kliger, Trademark Dilution: The
Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L.
REv. 789 at 802 (1997).
2002]
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others than the first to coin the trademark.53 Thus, once a mark
such as KODAK or BVD54 was coined, the term could never be
used again as a trademark for any good or service regardless of
consumer confusion, or lack thereof.55
Schechter's drastic shift in proposal can be attributed to several
primary factors. First among these was the dramatic change of
consumption, commerce, and industry occurring in the 1920's.
Specifically, the development of chain store operations and the
decline of the traditional point-of-manufacture sale created the
expansion of goods, and thus competition, far beyond previous
norms. Schecter perceived that this expansion combined with the
"apparent failure of the courts to keep pace with the necessities of
trade and the functional development of trademarks ... "
warranted a dramatic and rapid shift in current trademark law.
56
Further frustrated by the delay of courts to adopt an evolution of
the traditional consumer confusion test, which required
competition before relief could be granted, Schechter believed the
time was right for a dramatic change. Thus, Schecter premised his
more radical proposal by stating:
. . . I]f there is no competition, there can be no
unfair competition, is the rule that a trademark or
tradename is only coextensive with its use and may
be used by different firms in different localities. To
hold that Boston and Providence markets do not
extend to Worchester, New Haven and
Woonsocket, that a nationally known chain of
theatres, with a branch in Boston, did not extend its
market, or rather its audience, to Lynn, Lawrence,
Portland or Fitchburg, or that plaintiffs stores in
Northern New Jersey could not enjoin the use of
53 Kliger, supra note 2, at 804-805.
54 Not surprisingly, Schechter's radical pro-business theory included in gross
property rights for this trademark, as he was employed as trademark counsel for
this company.
55 Kliger, supra note 2, at 806.
56 Schechter, supra note 3, at 824.
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plaintiff's tradename in Southern New Jersey at
point twenty to thirty miles away, ignores the
necessities of the chain type organization with
which the United States has been covered in recent
years. 7
Moreover, Schechter noted that recent technological
developments had also drastically altered the effectiveness of the
traditional consumer confusion model. Specifically, the
development and proliferation of the automobile, telephone,
motorbus, trolley, and railroad had significantly expanded an
average consumer's geographic shopping zone.58 Thus, Schechter
believed that trademark law had disregarded the growth of
commerce and was likely to fail in its very purpose if drastic
changes were not immediately adopted.
A second factor was the inability to keep up with violations of
the law. As the economy expanded and money circulated,
trademark pirates became more sophisticated in their
infingements. Schechter noted:
Trademark pirates are growing more subtle and
refined. They proceed circumspectly, by
suggestion and approximation, rather than by direct
and exact duplication of their victim's wares and
marks. The history of important trademark
litigation within recent years shows the use of
similar marks on non-competing goods is perhaps
the normal rather than the exceptional case of
infringement.
59
Thus, trademark law had not only ignored recent developments in
the economy, it had arguably lost its effectiveness of purpose,
namely to prevent consumer confusion.
A third factor that contributed to Schechter's dramatic shift was
7 Id. at 824.
58.1d.
59 1d. at 825.
2002]
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his recognition of a trademark's commercial magnetism, virtually
ignored by the traditional consumer confusion test.60 Schechter's
1927 article immediately recognized that trademarks do more than
assure consumers of quality, they create and preserve goodwill
through their ingenuity and originality.61 Schecter observed:
If Kodak may be used for both tubs and cakes,
Mazda for cameras and shoes, or Ritz-Carlton for
coffee, these marks must inevitably be lost in the
commonplace words of the language, despite the
originality and ingenuity in their contrivance, and
the vast expenditures in advertising them which the
courts concede should be protected to the same
extent as plant or machinery.
62
Thus, Schecter believed that the traditional consumer confusion
test did not protect an aspect of trademarks that courts had
articulated as protection worthy, namely a company's investment
in its own goodwill.
In short, Schechter's radical proposal of complete abandonment
of a consumer confusion test for arbitrary and fanciful marks was
based on the inability of the law and the unwillingness of courts to
reform trademark law to the realities of modem commerce in the
post-Industrial Revolution era.63 Ultimately the in gross nature of
Schechter's dilution proposal proved too radical and was never
adopted in full. The ideas and realizations he articulated, however,
led to the formal extension and evolution of the consumer
confusion protection model to completely dissimilar goods.
Just one year after Schechter's proposal, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that the use of the mark YALE in
60 Kliger, supra note 2, at 806.
61 Schechter, supra note 3, at 818.
62 Robert N. Kliger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. 789, at 806 (1997) citing
F. I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REV.
813, at 830 (1927).
63 Kliger, supra note 2, at 810.
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connection with metal locks and a subsequent junior use in
connection with flashlights was impermissible though the goods
were completely dissimilar.64 In so holding, the court stated:
It has of recent years been recognized that a
merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in
the use of his mark outside the field of his own
expl6itation to justify interposition by a court. His
mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the
goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or
ill. If another uses it, he borrows the owner's
reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his
own control. This is an injury, even though the
borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by
its use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of
its possessor and creator, and another can use it
only as a mask. And so it has come to be
recognized that, unless the borrower's use is so
foreign to the owner's as to insure against any
identification of the two, it is unlawful.
65
Thus, Schechter was successful in that he succeeded in prompting
the courts to cease applying a similar goods criteria to the
consumer confusion test and forced courts to recognize that the
value of a trademark is not limited to consumer oriented theories
of source indication, but also lies in a trademark owners
investment in and trademark's development of goodwill.
Schechter's success was limited, however, because the Yale court
was unwilling to completely abandon consumer confusion, as he
proposed.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DILUTION
In light of the radical nature of Schechter's dilution proposal,
64 Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).6
. Id. at 974.
2002]
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courts universally opted to follow the Yale precedent and extend
the traditional consumer confusion model to cover non-competing
goods instead of scrapping it altogether.66 The decision of courts
to modify the existing consumer confusion test left Schechter's
proposal on the periphery of trademark law. The federal
legislature soon followed the lead of the courts and in 1946 the
Lanham Act eliminated the "same descriptive properties"
requirement and extended infringement to the use of a junior mark
that "is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive." 67 Thus, it appeared as if the dilution theory articulated
by Schechter was left to the history books.
A. States 'Revival of the Dilution Theory
In 1947, however, just one year after the federal legislature's
choice to expand the consumer confusion test, Massachusetts
adopted the first antidilution statute.68 In its original form, the
Massachusetts' proposal followed Schechter's idea of extending
dilution protection to only the most arbitrary or fanciful of
marks.6 9 Soon thereafter, other state legislatures followed the lead
66 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Dunhill Shirt Shop, Inc., 3 F. Supp.
487, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1882 (D.N.Y. 1929); Ponemah Mills v. Universal
Crepe & Tissue Mills Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q. 269 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 1929); Finchley,
Inc. v. Finchly Co., 40 F.2d 736, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1863 (D. Md. 1929);
Time, Inc. v. Viobin Corp., 40 F. Supp. 249, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2903, 51
U.S.P.Q. 150 (D. Ill. 1941); Del Monte Special Food Co. v. California Packing
Corp., 34 F.2d 774, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 3310,3 U.S.P.Q. 15 (9th Cir. Cal.
1929); California Packing Corp. v. Tillman & Bendel, Inc., 40 F.2d 108, 17
C.C.P.A. 1048, 1930 C.C.P.A. LEXIS 260, 1930 Dec. Comrm'r Pat. 215, 5
U.S.P.Q. 59 (C.C.P.A. 1930); Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. American Grocer
Co., 40 F.2d 116, 17 C.C.P.A. 1034, 1930 C.C.P.A. LEXIS 256, 1930 Dec.
Comm'r Pat. 238, 5 U.S.P.Q. 68 (C.C.P.A. 1930).
67 15 U.S.C. §1114 (1)(a) (1996).
68 See Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, §7(a), 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (codified as
amended at Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 110(B), § 12 (West 1996)).69 Walter J. Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution
Statutes, 44 Cal. L. Rev. 439, 452 (1956). It should be noted, however, that the
final version of the bill drafted by the Senate and enacted into law protected all
trademarks from dilution regardless of the arbitrary or fanciful nature of the
mark. Though this broad protection was even more radical than Schechter's
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of Massachusetts. In 1953, Illinois enacted an antidilution statute70
and in 1955 New York and Georgia both enacted their own
antidilution statutes.7 1 In 1963, following a delay of eight years,
Connecticut was the next state to enact its antidilution statute.
7 2
The following year, the United States Trademark Association
incorporated dilution language into its Model State Trademark
Bill. 3 The incorporation of dilution language in to a widely
followed model statute quickly propelled Schechter's seemingly
forgotten proposal to the surface and ensured that it would
continue for some time to come.
Though each state statute was different in text, they were
amazingly similar in substance.74 All state antidilution statutes
proposal, it became the norm. The faults of state antidilution statutes, however,
are a topic for another time.
70 See Act of June 24, 1955, § 1, 1953 IlM. L. 455 (codified as amended at 765 IlM.
Comp. Stat. Ann. 1036/15).
71 See Act of Apr. 18, 1955, ch. 453, §1, 1955 N.Y. Laws 466 (codified as
amended at N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §368-d (McKinney 1996)); 1955 Ga. Laws
453, §1 (codified as amended at Ga. Code Ann. §10-1-451(b) (1994)).
72 See Conn. Gen. Stat. §35-1 li(c) (1963).
73 Model State Trademark Bill §12 (U.S. Trademark Ass'n 1964). The Model
State Trademark Bill "was first promulgated by the United States Trademark
Association ... in 1949 to promote uniformity among state trademark laws."
Andrew L. Goldstein, Bringing the Model State Trademark Bill into the 90s and
Beyond, 83 Trademark Rep. 226, 226 (1993) citing from Robert N. Kliger,
Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark
Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, at 813 n. 132 (1997).
74 See generally Ala. Code §8-12-17 (1993); Ark. Code Ann. §4-71-201 (Michie
1996); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §14330 (West 1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §35-
1li(c) (West 1996); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §3313 (1993); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§495.151 (West 1997); Ga. Code Ann. §10-1-451(b) (1994); Idaho Code §48-
512 (1996); 765 IM. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1036/15 (West 1996); Iowa Code Ann.
§548.113 (West 1996); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §51:223.1 (West 1997); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §1530 (West 1996); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 110B, §12
(West 1996); Minn. Stat. Ann. §325D.165 (West 1995); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§417.061 (West 1997); Mont. Code Ann. §30-13334 (1995); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§87-122 (1994); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §350-A:12 (1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. §56:3-
13.20 (West 1996); N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-3-10 (Michie 1995); N.Y. Gen. Bus.
Law §368-d (McKinney 1996); OR. Rev. Stat. §647.107 (1994); 54 Pa. Cons.
Stat. §1124 (1994); R.I. Gen. Laws §6-2-12 (1992); S.C. Code Ann. §39-15-
1165 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); Tenn. Code Ann. §47-25-512 (1995); Tex. Bus.
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share three primary qualities.75 First, all state antidilution statutes
grant protection to all trademarks, not just the most arbitrary and
fanciful, as Schecter proposed nearly 40 years prior.76 Second, all
state statutes require that a senior user prove the likelihood of harm
from the junior user's use. 77 Lastly, all state antidilution statutes
only injunctive relief as the only remedy for the senior user.78
With the dilution theory now codified, albeit at the state level, the
only remaining hurdle for dilution in gaining recognition and
prominence was judicial interpretation.
B. Judicial Reaction To Dilution
Prior to the wide acceptance of antidilution statutes at the state
level, courts were intrigued by dilution. This was seen in cases
decided shortly after Schechter's 1927 article. One of the first of
these was Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Products, Inc.7 9 In Tiffany, the
Supreme Court of New York decided that plaintiff, jewelry
company, was entitled to prevent defendant, movie company, from
use of the mark TIFFANY and a diamond logo in connection with
the production and distribution of films.80 Though the court could
have easily applied the newly evolved consumer confusion test,
which was applicable to non-competing goods, it elected to apply a
dilution theory in granting plaintiff s petition for relief.81 The
court stated:
The real injury in such cases of non-competitive
products 'is the gradual whittling away or
& Corn. Code Ann. § 16.29 (West 1997); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.77.160
(West 1997).
75 Kliger, supra note 2, at 813.
76id.
77id.
78 id.
79 147 Misc. 679; 264 N.Y.S. 459; 1932 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1315 (N.Y.
1932), Affd., 237 A.D. 801, 260 N.Y.S. 821, 1932 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS
5356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932).
80 Id.81id,
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dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public
mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-
competing goods. The more distinctive or unique
the mark the deeper is its impress upon the public
consciousness and the greater its need for protection
against vitiation or dissociation from the particular
product in connection with which it has been
used.' 8
2
Thus, the court embraced the dilution theory when it could have
easily applied the evolved consumer confusion test.
A second judicial decision recognizing dilution as an actionable
theory was Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg.83 In Bulova, plaintiff
Bulova Watch Company sought to enjoin defendant Stolzberg, a
Massachusetts resident, who manufactured and sold shoes under
the trade name 'Eddie's Shoes.' 84 Defendant also engaged in the
stamping of his shoes with the trademark BULOVA FINE
SHOES.85 Though the court held that Stolzberg was not infringing
through the process of stamping his shoes, he was nonetheless
enjoined from use of the mark based on the theory of trademark
dilution. The court observed:
... [C]ases have come to recognize that it is the
'unfairness' of the defendant's conduct rather than
the existence of 'competition' between plaintiff and
defendant which forms the basis for the intervention
of a court of equity. The trade-mark not only serves
to designate the source of the owner's products, but
also stands as a symbol of his good will and hence
is an instrument for the creation and retention of
custom. Where the mark is strong, i.e., unique or
fanciful, the courts have been more prone to grant
82 Id. at 682.
" 69 F. Supp. 543; 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2901; 72 U.S.P.Q. 72. (D. Mass.
1947).
84 id.
85 id.
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protection from use on non-competing goods. 86
Thus, courts initially approved of Schechter's dilution proposal
and began to explicitly recognize that fame, recognition, and
goodwill were assets in need of protection.
Despite courts early affection with dilution, it was short-lived.
Courts quickly began to believe that the dilution theory was
undermining the long sustained consumer protection aspect of
trademarks. This judicial skepticism resulted in a lack of literal
application of the statute. 87 Thus, judicial decisions began to apply
privately held beliefs to the application of the dilution doctrine.
One such example of a court's non-literal application of dilution
law can be found in Maison Prunier v. Prunier Restaurant & Cafi,
Inc.88 In Prunier, plaintiff ran a restaurant operation in Paris and
London. 89 Defendant attempted to capitalize on the fame of the
restaurant by opening a restaurant in New York by the same
name.90  The court was reluctantly forced into applying the
dilution standard because of the regional separation, and thus the
lack of competition, between the two restaurants. 91 The court
stated:
In our own State the doctrine that the two products
need not be competitive to entitle the proprietor of
the mark to relief has received judicial sanction.
'Plaintiff, however, is entitled to be protected not
only from direct competition, but from any injury
which might result to it from the deception of the
public through the unauthorized use of its trade
name, or a trade name which would lead the public
to believe that it was in some way connected with
86 id.
17 Kliger, supra note 2 at 815.
88 159 Misc. 551; 288 N.Y.S. 529; 1936 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1192 (N.Y.
1936).
89 Id.
9 Id.
91 Id.
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plaintiff.'92
The court, however, was not pleased in applying this standard.
This was noted in its comment that "the law on this subject 'is in a
most unsatisfactory state."' 93 Based on its dissatisfaction with the
current law, the court limited dilution by applying several non-
statutory mitigating factors. The court stated:
The doctrine, however, is not without its
limitations. First. The original holder of the mark
may be entitled to a natural field of legitimate trade
expansion, although the cases are not very definite
on this point and indicate that some user, however
slight, is necessary in the disputed territory.
Second. The doctrine, it has been clearly suggested,
does not apply where the second adopter is guilty of
bad faith or where the use is made in such manner
as to operate as a fraud upon the public.
94
Thus, the Prunier court hinted at a geographical limitation and
applied a good faith requirement to the application of the state's
antidilution statute.
Another such case that judicially limited the application of
antidilution statutes, notwithstanding legislative language, was
Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Manufacturing Co.95 In Esquire,
Plaintiff, magazine publisher under the trademark ESQUIRE, filed
suit seeking injunctive relief against defendant, slipper
manufacturer, for use of its trademark ESQUIRE as part of its
company name.96 Though the court found that the matter was a
dilution case because the parties were not directly competing with
one another in the sale of similar goods, the plaintiff was not
entitled to relief because it was not entitled to exclusive use of the
92id.
93 159 Misc. 551; 288 N.Y.S. 529; 1936 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1192 (N.Y. 1936).94 id.
9' 243 F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 1957).96id.
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word Esquire.97 In so holding, the court stated:
This is obviously a dilution case, for clearly the
parties are not directly competing with one another
in the sale of similar goods. But the fact that the
parties are not trading in goods of the same
descriptive properties, i.e. that one is selling a
magazine and the other men's slippers, does not
prevent the plaintiff from asserting a cause of action
for trade-mark infringement under the Lanham Act,
for the test of infringement under that act is not
similarity of goods or services but whether the
marks used are so similar as to be 'likely to cause
confusion... or to deceive purchasers as to the
source of origin of (the respective) goods or
services.' 98
Accordingly, the Esquire court read the Massachusetts'
antidilution statute to be a simple extension of the consumer
confusion test to non-competing goods. It should be noted that
this interpretation of antidilution statutes was not limited to
Massachusetts. New York courts routinely required a showing of
confusion, fraud, or deceit before affording protection from
dilution. 99 Thus, in spite of apparent new life to Schechter's
proposal through the passage of state legislation, judicial activism
reigned in the dilution theory to its pre-statutory position.
Three factors are singled out to explain the intense hostility the
judiciary exhibited concerning dilution. Foremost was the courts'
"skepticism about the desirability of this particular form of
ownership protection." 100  Specifically, courts believed that
97 id.
9
' Id. at 542.
99 See generally Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. 702
F. Supp. 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); G.B. Kent & Sons, Ltd. v. P. Lorillard Co., 114
F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y 1953).
0 Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O'-TheWisp?, 77 HARV. L. REV.
520, 525 (1964) as cited in Kliger, supra note 2, at 816.
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antidilution statutes put absolute control into the hands of the
trademark owner and crippled the consumer protection function of
trademarks.' 0' Put simply, courts were not ready to embrace a
theory that removed a traditional consumer protection model from
the public and placed it in the hands of Corporate America. The
second factor was the difficulty courts had in applying the dilution
test.102 The statutes neither articulated standards to determine or
define the whittling away of a trademark's uniqueness nor defined
the term dilution or the types of marks protected. 10 3 This lack of
clarity resulted in an ad hoc procedure that may have led to
limiting decisions, as well as a general reluctance to apply the
standards at all. The final, and the most simplistic, factor is the
refusal of the Lanham Act to recognize dilution.'0 4 Some courts
may have simply relied on federal preemption of the state
antidilution statutes to relegate dilution to the sidelines. Whatever
the reason(s), it was once again clear that dilution was pushed to
the periphery of trademark law.
C. Dilution Reborn
For thirty years, state antidilution statutes had been reduced to a
legal footnote through judicial activism. Through non-literal
application of the statutes, dilution was left ineffectual. Among
the most "stubborn and illogical"'1 5 were the New York Courts.'0 6
These courts had a history of looking at trademark protection and
requiring historical elements, such as fraud and deception, in the
application of modem statutes, despite the absence of such
statutory requirements. 0 7 In this context, it is only fitting that
dilution was given new life in the New York Court of Appeals.
101 Kliger, supra note 2, at 816.
102 id.
103 id.
o4 Id.
10- Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark - Trade
Identity Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 618 at 624
(1976).
106 id.
107 Kliger, supra note 2, at 815.
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In 1977, the New York Court of Appeals decision in Allied
Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc. gave new
life to dilution. 10 8 In Allied, plaintiff, a cleaning and maintenance
business named Allied Maintenance Corporation, sued defendant,
a heating and ventilating business named Allied Mechanical
Trades, Inc., under New York state's anti-dilution statute. 10 9 The
state trial court granted the injunction finding that the parties were
actual and potential competitors in the cleaning and maintenance
industry in the New York City area and that similarity between
their names created a likelihood of confusion. 110 The Appellate
Division reversed, finding there was no competition or confusion,
actual or potential."' Though the court found that plaintiff was
not entitled to relief, it stated:
Generally courts, which have had the opportunity to
interpret an anti-dilution statute, have refused to
apply its provisions literally. New York courts,
State and Federal, have read into the statute a
requirement of some showing of confusion, fraud or
deception.... Notwithstanding the absence of
judicial enthusiasm for the anti-dilution statutes, we
believe that section 368-d does extend the
protection afforded trade-marks and trade names
beyond that provided by actions for infringement
and unfair competition. The evil which the
Legislature sought to remedy was not public
confusion caused by similar products or services
sold by competitors, but a cancer-like growth of
dissimilar products or services which feeds upon
the business reputation of an established distinctive
trade-mark or name....The harm that section 368-d
is designed to prevent is the gradual whittling away
of a firm's distinctive trade-mark or name. It is not
108 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977).
'
09 Id. at 1163.
110 Id.
111 Id.
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difficult to imagine the possible effect which the
proliferation of various noncompetitive businesses
utilizing the name Tiffany's would have upon the
public's association of the name Tiffany's solely
with fine jewelry. The ultimate effect has been
appropriately termed dilution."
12
In short, the court's dicta criticized judicial failure to apply the
antidilution statute as written and advocated the literal application
of antidilution statutes in the future. This was the momentum that
the dilution theory needed to enter and remain in mainstream
trademark law.
In years immediately following Allied, court opinions addressed
dilution more than the previous fifty years combined."
13
Furthermore, a majority of courts surrendered to the plain
language of antidilution statutes." 4  Thus, dilution theory first
articulated in 1927 entered mainstream trademark law as a valid
cause of action.
1 15
112 Id. at 1165-66.
113 Pattishall, supra note 105, at 691.
114 See Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 1983)
("Confusion and direct competition are not necessary elements of an anti-
dilution action under New York law.'); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway
Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1167 (llth Cir. 1982) (finding no
competition or confusion required under Florida's antidilution law); Scott v.
Mego Int'l, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1118, 1137 (D. Minn. 1981) ("Confusion or the
likelihood of confusion is not a necessary premise to an action for trademark
dilution.") quoting Klinger, supra note 2, at 820 n. 173.
1s The importance of State antidilution statutes must not be overstated. In spite
of its ultimate acceptance in 1977, courts granted relief on dilution causes of
action only 16 times from 1977 to 1996. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc.,
41 F.3d 39,45 (2d Cir. 1994); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir.
1988); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Serv., 736 F.2d 1153, 1158 (7th Cir. 1984);
Community Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Orondorff, 678 F.2d 1034, 1037 (1lth
Cir. 1982); Eventide Inc. v. DOD Elecs. Corp., No. 93 CIV. 2713(SS), 1995
WL 239044, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1995); McDonald's Corp. v. Arche
Techs., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1557, 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Hester Indus. Inc.
v. Tyson Foods Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275, 1280 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); Coca-
Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 725, 729 (N.D. M]1. 1989);
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IV. EXTERNAL FACTORS
As discussed above, the dilution cause of action for trademarks
struggled for approximately 70 years before it was adopted into
federal law. During this time, dilution's popularity and acceptance
had many peaks and valleys. Due to the varying degree of
acceptance and the length of time dilution fought to be accepted, it
is difficult to pinpoint specific external factors leading to dilution's
given popularity at a given time. Some conclusions may be drawn,
however, based upon certain eras.
First among these is the era of dilution's creation. It is generally
recognized that the dilution theory was created in 1927, the height
of the roaring twenties. The country was emerging from the most
rapid technological advancement of manufacturing the world had
ever seen. Specifically, the immediate post-Industrial Revolution
era gave rise to the assembly line, commonly cited today as a great
leap forward in the production process. At the same time
traditional "mom and pop" operations began to disappear in favor
of large multi-faceted stores, and chain operations began to spread
throughout the country. With these advancements, the United
States completely stepped out of the agrarian economy that had
dominated the world for centuries and advanced into an industrial
economy.
Likewise, the mid-1990's, the era of dilution's final acceptance,
is recognized as a similar decade. The economy expanded at an
unprecedented rate, wealth was created through the stock market
for a significant numbers of Americans, and the general feeling
was of a paradigm shift in the economy due to the technology
advance of the computer age. Furthermore, the economy
Eastman Kodak Co. v. D.B. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116, 120 (W.D.N.Y. 1989);
American Express, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013; Sykes Lab., Inc. v. Kalvin,
610 F. Supp. 849, 858 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Cinnabar 2000
Haircutters, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 714 F.2d 112
(2d Cir. 1982); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
124, 135 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps League, 509 F.
Supp. 323, 333 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Dawn v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 358,
363 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377, 383 (Or.
1983) quoting from Klinger, supra note 2, at 820 n. 174.
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underwent an increase in the service industry, primarily through
computer related occupations, which some analysts claimed was
the final advancement of the U.S. economy into a full-scale service
economy.
It is not a coincidence that dilution has found its most
acceptance in these periods. As economies progress from agrarian,
to industrial, and finally to service, the law often struggles to keep
up with current economic conditions. Trademark law is no
exception. Faced with rapid technological and economic
developments, it is possible that dilution is turned to as an
immediate remedy to deal with the shortcomings of trademark law
when the economy, which grows rapidly in short spurts and then
levels out, initially outpaces society.
If this assumption is true, then following rapid economic
growth, which favors dilution, there would inevitably be a period
of flat or negative growth where dilution is disfavored. This can
be seen immediately following the introduction of dilution in the
late 1920s. As examined earlier, courts were originally interested
in the dilution theory as a cause of action only to become
disenchanted a few short years later. This disenchantment came as
the United States moved from unprecedented economic growth
into the recessionary period of the early 1930s. Of course this
recessionary period, combined with improper fiscal policies, led to
the Great Depression. Interestingly enough, the entire
recessionary period, and in fact the entire period of economic
uncertainty from 1930 to 1945, witnessed a strong disinterest in
the dilution theory. Immediately following this period, dilution
was reborn in the codification of state statutes. As the economy
progressed at an uneventful rate, dilution experienced a flat period
of acceptance where it was pushed aside and then revisited several
times.
Though dilution was reborn in 1977, it was not again widely
accepted until the introduction of the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act in late 1995, and its subsequent ratification in early 1996.116
This came as a surprise to most scholars as just a few years earlier
"6 15 U.S.C. §1125.
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dilution was intentionally omitted from the 1988 Trademark Law
Revision Act. 117  When put into the context of dilution as a
function of rapid economic expansion, however, the sudden
affinity with dilution appears logical. In 1988 the economy was
not rapidly advancing. This all changed, however, in 1991 when
the United States entered a period of economic expansion that
lasted ten years. This expansion was rapid and lengthier than any
in history. 118 Thus, it should come as no surprise that after several
years of growth, dilution once again came to the forefront.
The next test for dilution as a function of rapid economic
expansion will come as the United States moves forward in and
through the economic recession of the early 21st Century. If the
recession is short-lived, as many predict, then dilution will remain
unchanged. If, however, the current recession deepens, drags-on
or eventually creates a depression, then dilution will once again be
reigned in and placed in the legal tool shed only to emerge again in
the next rapid economic expansion.
V. CONCLUSION
I began this article by discussing the power a consumer
possesses in determining the fate of a company simply through
buying preferences. This power is in large part provided to the
consumer through the affixation of specific names, logos or
signaling devices. Many consumer advocates believe that the only
protection of these signaling devices should be based on the injury
suffered by a consumer when a third-party misappropriates a
signaling device to sell there wares. While I believe that this form
of protection must exist, protection also needs to be available for
the company whose very survival depends on the goodwill
accumulated in its trademark. Without protection from dilution,
companies lose incentive to affix identifying marks to their
products, or conversely trademark pirates would have increased
incentive to place established trademarks on their inferior goods.
117 See H.R. 5372, 100th Cong. (1988).
"a The economic expansion of the 1990s officially ended in March 2001.
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This, in turn could, lead to a loss of consumer protection through
the absence of any assurance in the purchasing context. Therefore,
the harm suffered through dilution is not limited to producers but
extends farther and causes an implicit consumer harm.
Furthermore, dilution appears to have a valid function in
buffering the gap between law and economic reality. If the
dilution as a function of rapid economic growth theory is correct,
then dilution must exist to protect legal rights in times of rapid
economic growth. Because of this valid function and of the
benefit dilution implicitly provides to consumers, dilution must be
embraced as a valid cause of action and a legitimate legal tool
available to protect both producers and consumers in varying
economic times.
Michael Adams
11 9
119 Michael Adams, a third year law student at DePaul University College of
Law, is presently employed by Diners Club International Ltd. as a law clerk
specializing in global intellectual property issues.
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